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**From Traditional Patron-Client Relations To Network Clientelism.
Depersonalization Of Informal Relations In Colombian Politics**

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Depersonalization of informal relations in Colombian politics**

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Introduction

This paper takes up a theoretical argumentation on how depersonalization and institutionalization in particular contexts do not always have the positive results usually attributed to these two elements of modern political systems. In some cases a dominant informal practice such as clientelism, which is highly personalized at its origin, does not disappear when societal change results in a depersonalization of the practice. We will use the case of Colombia to exemplify the theoretical argument that depersonalization, in contrast with institutionalist expectations, can lead to the consolidation of informal politics.

In the first part, the paper addresses conventional accounts of depersonalized modern politics and discusses the dualist view of institutions that separate formal and informal realms.

Then it will be shown, by using the Colombian example, how in this particular case the modernization of the state did not accomplish its goal of eradicating clientelism. Instead rather, clientelism adapted to modern institutions and by going through a process of depersonalization itself, remained the dominant mechanism of social and political control as well as the most important element of regime stability.

One key factor in this development were the political parties, so a further section will be devoted to discussing the role of parties in the depersonalization of clientelism.

After this, some implications of this arguments in light of recent developments in Colombia will be discussed, particularly the effects of destabilization of the party system on regime stability. This will show how the theoretical considerations taken into account here allow for an analysis of regime stability from a new perspective.

Personalization and informal politics

The process of state modernization or modern state building is conventionally associated with formalization of institutions, professionalization of state bureaucracy (Weber, 1976) and depersonalization of power relations. This is widely accepted and recent developments toward increased personalization of politics. Personalization, or the primacy of personality over institution, catch our attention and make the subject of scholar debate and conference topics such as this one.

Although the idea that political authority should be abstract and impersonal was already one of the foundations of the Roman republic (Finer 1997: 662), Roman law only partially made its way into the pre-modern European conception of the exercise of power and authority.

From Max Weber onwards the state based on rational, impersonal and accountable authority is considered to be a phenomenon of modernity. In the feudal state, authority was an attribute carried by individuals and it addressed individuals. The rules and practice of politics were determined by personal relationships (Benz, 2001: 12). The feudal order was based on dependency between persons and despite the presence of weberian group

stereotyping, based on codes of honour and contracts, power was exercised arbitrarily.

With the absolutist state some “modern” elements were introduced such as a monopoly on the legitimate use of force as well as authority based on the institution of the absolutely sovereign monarch; including an administrative apparatus at the service of the monarch. These are approximations to modern conceptions of institutionalized power and bureaucracy and away from personalized authority.

These elements are reinforced with the advent of the nation state and then fully realized in their modern form in the liberal democratic or constitutional state and further developed in later stages of the welfare state. (Benz 2001: 20).

In the modern conception of the state depersonalization is associated with proper functioning of institutions, with formality, rule of law, transparency and efficiency, while personalization is usually associated with at least the threat of corruption, inefficiency and informal practices such as pork barrel politics and clientelism.

A society governed by impersonal institutions, whose proper functioning does not depend on the individuals populating them nor on their personalities, is seen as one where formal and informal realms are separated and where the formal frames the informal sphere.

In this view institution and person are separated just as formal and informal are distinct.

A successful storyline for the modern state is one that describes a society in which state modernization goes hand in hand with loosening of personal ties, where access to benefits and services by the state is not determined by personal contacts, nor personal attributes.

Extreme forms of personalization of politics lie at the core of informal practices such as clientelism.¹ Personalization, understood as the primacy of personality over institution, leads to the emergence of two distinct modes of producing political decisions: a set of formal rules applied and enforced by institutions on the one hand and informal practices dependent on personal ties, informal relations and networks on the other.

Informal politics take up many forms and many functions. Not all are conducive to negative effects on the functioning of democracy and not all undermine the formal aspects (see for example O’Donnell’s long standing argument about the importance of informality). Sometimes it is the informal elements, which determine the efficiency of a political system. Indeed, no state functions only on the basis of formal rules, incentives and sanctions.² Still, personalization, when it leads to an erosion of formal rules, carries vices with it that are problematic for many reasons. Representation, from the point of view of democratic theory, is undermined when resource allocation and state functions are personalized. Personalization and forms of informality such as clientelism also lead to inefficient and excessive

¹ For the purposes of this paper clientelism in general is defined as a relationship between a patron and a client in which favours or services are given in exchange for loyalty or political support.

² See for a good overview of informal politics: Betz/Köllner 2000.

redistribution that discriminates against whole segments of society (Robinson/Verdier 2003).

Political scientists as well as actors engaged in reform draw on institutionalist and other accounts and propose to limit and ultimately eliminate negative effects of informal politics by introducing and reinforcing depersonalized institutional settings. That is, strengthen the formal frame around an inevitable and sometimes even desirable informal realm of day to day politics.

An account of a clientelist system losing its personalized foundation and moving towards depersonalized structures should be good news, looked at from this perspective. In what follows we will draw on the case of Colombian clientelism to argue against this assumption.

From traditional face-to-face to network clientelism

Traditional clientelism is based on personal dyadic relations between a patron and a client in which favours are exchanged and loyalties re-enforced. In political clientelism, the type that interests us here, favours are exchanged for political loyalties. In the classic form of traditional clientelist political exchange favours are exchanged for political loyalty, usually expressed in votes. This relationship is based on personal contact and on personal attributes. An individual is chosen by others as a patron because he possesses particular personal attributes. This can be charisma, reputation, etc. These same attributes have given him a position of power in the political elite. Either he is himself part of the ruling class or he has strong ties to it. This allows him to extend favours to others, in exchange for their continued support, which in turn will allow him to continue to be part of the elite.

A good theoretical definition of traditional clientelism is delivered by Scott (1972: 92): “The patron-client relationship – an exchange relationship between roles – may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates, by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.”

Powell’s definition consists of three elements, which he draws from traditional definitions given early on by anthropologists : the patron client relationship is characterized by (1) two parties of unequal status, wealth and influence, (2) the formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity in the exchange of (non-comparable) goods and services, and (3) the development and maintenance of patron-client relationships rests heavily on face-to-face contacts between the two parties (Powell 1970: 412).

As becomes evident from these two early examples of a definition, clientelism in the traditional form is typically personalistic and informal. The face-to-face and personal elements are central and the structure of the relationships is relatively simple. In dyadic face-to-face relations personality and personal attributes have to account in large part for how the relationship works: its duration, the nature of the exchanges and the results.

However, less personalized forms of network clientelism exist.

Lemarchand and Legg apply a very similar definition more explicitly to political clientelism, but with less stress on the personalized nature of the relationships: “Political clientelism may be viewed as a more or less personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships” (Lemarchand/Legg 1972: 151).

Although still making reference to persons and personal elements, this definition does take into account a different form of clientelism that chronologically evolved out of traditional clientelism to form a distinct structure of informal relations. One that is less based on personal attributes and relationships, and more on positions within a network or set of actors.

Common to both forms is that they are “characterized by the representation of narrow corporatist and local interests” (Wantchekon 2003: 400) in a context in which formal mechanisms of checks and balances are mostly ineffective or absent altogether.

The function remains the same, but the structure and mechanisms become more complex as dyads become networks. The process through which personalized traditional clientelism evolves into networks of clientelist exchanges is inherent in the mechanism of clientelism but strongly reinforced by societal conditions and changes thereof.

Clientelism is an instrumental alliance, in which the two members are of unequal power status (Martz 1997: 17; Wolfe 1966: 16). The asymmetry arises from the fact that the two sides have different resources at their disposal. Despite a certain degree of reciprocity the asymmetry allows for a single patron to defend the interests of several clients of lower power status. The asymmetry grows exponentially, since the patron draws further power resources from his various clients, while it is rarely the case that a client has more than one patron to turn to. It is however possible that some clients of a patron have in turn clients of their own. In this way more complex structures of clientelism begin to grow. Martz (1997: 18) describes the result as a system “composed of chains of vertical dyads linking the highest leaders to those at the bottom of the pyramid through a series of sub-leaders.” As this type of structure is much more complex than the traditional face-to-face between a single patron and his client, it relies more on the intermediaries than on direct control by the patron. The sub-patrons thus gain a new role, that of a broker that gives them extended power over their respective clients and influence towards their own patrons higher up the ladder. The brokers also have the task of bridging communication gaps within the system (Boissevain 1974). The position within the structure becomes a source of so called second order resources (strategic access to those with authority to control the distribution of resources), while the patrons hold and distribute first order resources (material assets such as land, jobs, favours).

The result is a clientelist network composed of patrons, clients and brokers in which the *position* of actors within the network rather than personality and personal attributes is the essential factor that determines to what degree the network fulfils its function.

The increased complexity in clientelist exchange structures reflects increased social complexity. New social demands and pressures demand the

“extension of clientelism beyond the original lord-vassal pattern” of feudal societies.

This link between societal changes and transformations of clientelism becomes more apparent when we look at it in a specific context.

From traditional clientelism to depersonalized clientelism: The Colombian case

Alongside the modernization and expansion of the state a transformation from traditional forms of patronage, to brokerage networks started to take place in Colombia in the first half of the 20th century.

According to Martz (1997: 12), the consequences of the advent of the bureaucratic state in Colombia from the 1910s onward were the “genuine” centralization of the system, pronounced statism, urbanization, the weakening of regional and local allegiances, industrialization, infrastructural improvements in transportation and communications, and economic diversification.

As a result, the exercise of authority, that is the processing of demands without loosing social and political control, demanded new mechanisms.

State centralization and market expansion created linkages between originally isolated communities that used to rely on one patron for access to the centre. With strengthened linkages, the role of the traditional patron declines and the role of brokers, actors of intermediate social status, increases in importance. In Colombia changes began in 1920s and spread rapidly in the 1930s and 1940s (Archer 1990: 3).

Traditional clientelism was rooted in the relations of rural landownership and the peasantry. With the advent of modernization, manifested for example in the increased penetration of technology to rural areas and, as a parallel process, the expansion of the central state and modernization of state bureaucracy, the base of social relations changed. At the same time the need for the elites to maintain and extend political and social controls persisted. Clientelism, the mechanism traditionally available as a means of control, retained its logic but changed its functional structure in response to the new conditions.

Personalistic, face-to-face relations between a patron and his clients were gradually replaced by what has been termed corporate, organized clientelism, or what we here have called clientelist networks.

Clientelism in Colombia (and in Latin America in general) shifted its nature in a process of “evolutionary response” (Martz 1997: 11) to modernization. Traditional forms of clientelism changed as social relationships shifted from feudal to patrimonial and finally to bureaucratic with the extension of the state (Martz 1997: 11; Archer 1990).³

With the expansion of the state and its bureaucracy came the nationalization of the economic system, the process of industrial growth, a depolarization

³ Martz compares early traditional clientelism to feudalism and notes a change towards what he calls “corporate” or “bureaucratic” clientelism. For the same shift Archer employs the terms “traditional” and “broker” clientelism.

between centre and periphery and dilution of regionalism and localism by expanded communication and transportation networks, urbanization of the population and the impact of technological change and innovation.

Another reason for the transformation of society in that period was the increased political violence during the 1940s which led to mass migration and changed social and demographic structures, which in turn affected traditional patron-client relations.

These circumstances weakened old personalized clientelistic forms of maintaining social and political control and made them obsolete. New forms of network and corporate clientelism developed in order to cope with the increased complexity of modernized Colombian society.

As has been shown in other research and described here, clientelism in general and in Colombia is a highly adaptive phenomenon. This accounts for its resilience. In the case of Colombia it has evolved in response to social and political changes. In a weak and limited state traditional clientelism was personalistic, face to face dyadic and asymmetric. With the extension of the state and the modernization of bureaucracy clientelism became more anonymous, systemic and networked. It has thus been proven that clientelism reacts to external influence of factors that make up different stages of state-building. This strengthens the base of the institutionalist hypothesis, that institutional change can be reflected in patterns of and incidence of clientelism. The question is whether the “right” institutional setting will weaken and at some point eradicate clientelism or whether clientelism will find yet new ways of responding and adapting to institutional change, and thus to persist as a feature of the political system.

The role of political parties

One very important factor in creating new clientelist linkages in Colombia was the existence of strong political partisanship.

In Colombia, electoral politics have long been considered to be inherently and systematically clientelistic (see among many others : Deas) Politicians running for public office, or incumbents looking to be re-elected, rely on the distribution of personal favours to selected members of the electorate in exchange for sustained political support.⁴

In situations where, as in the case of Colombia clientelism is largely a practice controlled by political parties and where patron-client relations take the form of “party-directed patronage” (Weingrod 1968; Graziano 1976), organizational rather than individual “face-to-face” relations become more important as the state expands and urbanization takes its course. In the modernized urban setting, broker clientelism makes yet another shift due to changing social and state structures towards “corporate clientelism” (Martz 1996, 23).

Because the institutions of the central state were already occupied by the members of the traditional parties, the extension of the state to more

⁴ The most basic definition of clientelism used by most authors. See among others: Wantchekon 2003: 399.

peripheral areas did not, as in many other state-building phases in Latin America, lead to a reshaping of party power within the administration. The competition for power in the newly integrated areas followed the same patterns as in the established zones.

As the state expanded, the fact that Colombia's overwhelmingly rural population had already been largely socialized and politicized into one or another of the two traditional parties meant that emerging broker-patrons were able to build personal loyalties on top of underlying party loyalties.

Bureaucratization brought with it more opportunities for brokerage as did rapid economic growth during this period. Modernisation of tax collection, the Panama settlement, import substitution policies, and other factors altered the economic structure and provoked a rapid expansion of the internal market.

Patronage becomes more complex as urban populations are much more integrated in social networks. In order to maintain a system that stabilizes patron-client relations that survive increasing mobility and increasing demands by an increasingly sophisticated and less isolated electorate, complex and active organizations have to be in place through which favours and loyalty are exchanged. Political parties provide the characteristics to be such active organizations and take over that role, especially if they have already been the dominant socializing agents for large parts of the population and played this role before the definite establishment of the state.

With more complex social structures it becomes harder for single individual patrons to control and enforce clientelist contracts. The single patron (eg. candidate standing for re-election) no longer has the resources to have the oversight over his clientele, that has become more detached, more mobile, in short more complex and sophisticated. The party as an organisation becomes instrumental in reaching a maximum of clients, enforcing clientelist exchanges and keeping track of loyalties. This function of the traditional parties became even more urgent with the weakening and dilution of the corporatist state in the 1960s.

Political parties provide the organizational sources for both economic and political rewards, sometimes in open competition with the state. When facing a state with low (re-)distributive capacities, the parties have every chance of coming out ahead. The rewards are bestowed through the brokers to the ultimate clients. Parties offer the possibility of mobilizing broad popular support and to meet the demands of society. They become very extensive networks linking the very top with the very bottom of the clientelist chain through a series of brokers in the middle. Only large organizations such as large and well established parties can effectively control all echelons of the chain and be transfer vehicles for exchanges that move vertically as well as horizontally through the whole extension of the network.

Implications of institutional change

In 1995 Mainwaring and Scully measured institutionalization degrees of party systems in Latin America based on a set of the following four criteria: 1) stable patterns of interparty competition⁵; 2) parties that are strongly rooted in society; 3) voters see parties and elections as legitimate as well as necessary and desirable; and 4) parties that are well organized and not dependent on one leader or small group.

A party system that fulfils all four of these conditions was considered by Mainwaring and Scully to be institutionalized. At the other extreme were systems that did not fulfil any of the four criteria, these are inchoate systems, characterized by high volatility, where levels of personalization are very high with voters voting more for a candidate than for a party (see Rial 1995 on “personalization of politics”), large numbers of switch-voters, large numbers of the electorate question the legitimacy of the elections and the parties taking part in them, and where parties are subordinate to single leaders or small groups.

In 1995 they concluded, that Colombia had an institutionalized system, reaching a score of 10.5 out of a possible total of 12.0.

Today however the scores for Colombia would probably look different. As Boudon has argued, the political crisis of the 1990s has left a political vacuum that has only been filled by disconnected social movements and independent candidates and not by new well organized parties. The crisis produced what Pizarro has called “political micro-enterprises” (micorempresas politicas); that is small, short-lived machineries with the only aim of serving as a vehicle for an individual to make enough votes to be elected. After election the micro-party disappears. This was the trend from the middle of the 90s until 2003. In 2003 an ambitious political reform aimed at curbing this and other symptoms of deinstitutionalization was passed by Congress. However, this was not the first attempt at broad reform. The 1991 complete revision of the constitution already contained large scale changes to the electoral regime and political system, yet they did not have the desired results.

With the coming into force of the new constitution in 1991 a first of two successful and radical political reforms started to have an effect on political competition in Colombia. At the same time renewed political turmoil and violence stemming from both the armed conflict with guerrilla and paramilitary groups as well as from drug related violence were again putting the state and political actors under severe pressure. The incapacity of the state to effectively deal with these challenges was mirrored in the incapacity of the political parties to answer to the demands being put forward by the society as a reaction and by modernizing forces in the system (Ungar / Arévalo 2004: 54). In this period, the combination of several institutional changes following the new constitution and increasing political instability, the Colombian party system started to show signs of rapid de-

⁵ Based on Pedersen’s electoral volatility index; that is the net change in votes or seats obtained by a party from one election to the next.

institutionalization. These signs were strongest in the last two dimensions listed by Mainwaring: the legitimacy of political organizations and organizational strength of the internal party structures (Mainwaring / Scully 1995). The result of the clash of radically reforming institutions in a context of increased instability was rapidly felt by the party system, particularly in the shape of party atomization and fragmentation as well as increasing personalization of the electoral process with its negative effects on organizational degrees of political parties. The directly observable manifestation of these effects was the proliferation of lists, movements and parties that increased sharply in every electoral contest after the constitutional reform.

Another blow to the weakened Colombian political system and its institutions that would also affect the party system came after the scandal following the 1994 election of Ernesto Samper to the presidency as evidence was produced that his campaign had received large amounts of financing from the Cali drug cartel. For the next four years a long process followed during which highest circles of the party were indicted and the president faced impeachment by Congress in 1997. Increasingly candidates for legislative elections felt that they were better off if they weren't associated directly with one of the discredited traditional parties and preferred running under independent lists, movements and new parties.

Levels of trust in political parties had been relatively high for Colombia until the late 1990s when they began to drop significantly. While in 1997 parties enjoyed trust levels slightly below 30% (29.08 according to the 1997 Latinobarometro⁶) they had dropped to 10% only five years later (10.01% in the 2002 Latinobarometro).

Since 1989 Colombia has been undergoing a systemic crisis. The State has been engaged in an armed conflict with many fronts at the same time as battling drug trafficking, with its inevitable ramifications such as corruption, as became most visible with the impeachment of the president in 1997. This kind of crisis, which was felt very strongly by the traditional political parties, held responsible for much of the partial collapse of the state (Kline 1999), exemplifies what La Palombara and Weiner suggest is a necessary break for the emergence of new parties and the consequent transformation of the party system (La Palombara / Weiner 1966: 21). Events that partially corroborate this hypothesis for the Colombian case took place during the 1998 electoral year, in which regional and national legislative and executive election took place with a clear increase in the participation of new parties. In the presidential election the independent candidate finished a strong third behind the candidates of the traditional parties, and in the elections to the lower house, 30 percent of the seats went to candidates that were not affiliated directly with any of the two traditional parties. Four years earlier this figure had been at 19% (Boudon 2000: 33).

In 1991 23 parties held seats in the Senate, this number jumped to 49 in 1994 and again to 62 in 1998, it remained at 62 for the 2002 elections. To this it should be added that the average life span of parties is low. Of the 121

⁶ Although it should be mentioned that in general trust levels for political parties were above average in all countries covered in 1997, probably caused by measurement problems.

different parties that held Senate seats between 1991 and 2001 only 41 were held seats in more than one legislature, the other 80 didn't manage to win a single seat a second time or didn't even present candidates. Only 11 were represented in all four legislative periods from 1991 to 2002 and only 6 were present in the last three periods (Giraldo 2003: 26; Ungar/Arévalo 2004: 55; Pizarro 2001: 121).

Over one hundred and fifty years of dominance by the two traditional parties were coming to an end amidst a period of institutional crisis, state collapse and new low levels of trust in political parties. The de-institutionalization of the party system was partly the result of the crisis but could also have significant implications for the stability of the political regime; especially given the role of clientelism as a mechanism of social and political control. From 1998 onwards, the traditional parties, the vessels that best applied the mechanism of clientelism were under strong competition from new parties with probably less potential to maintain complex networks of patrons, clients and brokers.

Chronologically speaking the events that we have traced so far can be summed up in four steps: 1) crisis of the traditional two-party system, due to a context we have agreed with other authors can best be called one of "besieged democracy"; 2) a first attempt at redressing the crisis through institutional change with the constitutional reform of 1991 3) deinstitutionalization and introduction of a new set of actors, namely new independent, weakly organized movements and parties, the phenomenon of "political micro-enterprises"; and 4) a second attempt to correct this undesired result of the 1991 constitutional reform, namely the political reform of 2003.

The question now is, what does this mean for clientelism, which as discussed in the previous chapter was a phenomenon closely attached if not inherent in the two-party system and the way the two traditional parties operated?

In Colombia the primary mechanisms of regime support mobilization are a large number clientele networks which mobilize support through the downward distribution of state and party resources (Archer 1990: 6). The question of how this support system has yet again changed into a new form of clientelism in part given, as we argue here, to recent institutional change becomes crucial to estimate the continued stability of the regime. If the new form of clientelism, faced with the extreme fragmentation of the party system, cannot cope in a fully saturated support market, where will continued support for the regime come from and how will it be mobilized? There are two alternatives to clientelist support: programmatic, policy oriented support on the one hand and personalized populist support on the other. Is Colombia currently just one step behind other Latin American cases that have seen a re-emergence of populism, precisely because clientelism does no longer work? Or is it on the verge to "normalization" of democratic representative politics, based on programmatic and policy oriented party competition? These are questions that are the product of the

line of reasoning presented here. They must remain unanswered for the moment, until more research allows us to give approximate answers.

Conclusion

We have described how clientelism, a highly personalized form of informal politics, can go through processes of depersonalization and modernization parallel to state processes of modernization. This happens because of the adaptive characteristics of political clientelism, and as a response to societal changes. As argued above the traditional parties were the only organizations capable to keep up with the increasing complexity of society as the state expanded. As new mechanisms for social and political control became necessary, parties were able to adapt to this need and in turn clientelism shifted from traditional patron-client relations to more complex networks of brokerage.

We have also argued that the coincidence of a weakening state and institutional incentives towards an opening of the traditional two-party system had the negative effect of de-institutionalizing the party system, producing a plethora of loosely organized, weak and short lived political parties and movements, almost as if the two-party system had imploded, shifting the Colombian party system from one of the most institutionalized and concentrated to one of the most fragmented in Latin America.

Combining the two arguments thus leads us to assume that this change in party system stability and degree of institutionalization must have had an effect on parties' capabilities to assume the coherent role in providing mechanisms of social control.

It is evident that smaller parties cannot fulfil the function of maintaining complex clientelist networks on the same scale as the huge traditional parties. In a way, what has happened to the party systems signals a return of personalized party politics, with the advent of candidate oriented micro-parties. As these parties start making up the bulk of the party system, this should affect the clientelist structures of Colombian politics.

One possible result is that clientelism has not lost its appeal as a mobilising strategy, even among small parties. Thus it would still be present as a mobilizing strategy among some of these newer parties. Yet it would have lost its function as a mechanism to exert social and political control and thus its value for regime stability. On the one hand this could encourage a deeper transformation of the regime towards more democratic reforms; on the other hand this could weaken Colombia's already "besieged" democracy and lead the country to a phase of further destabilization.

In order to strengthen some of the arguments made here more empirical research in these areas is needed. Especially the link between undesired consolidation of informal practices and depersonalization deserves more attention.

The field of informality has been treated theoretically but given the difficult nature of its subject little empirical efforts exist to measure phenomena like personalization or clientelism.

Another task for researchers could be to test other hypotheses, made here implicitly, about the relation of clientelism and regime stability in the face of party system fragmentation.

The existence of clientelism in contexts such as Latin America, Africa or Eastern Europe is often considered as given and its relationship with state capacity and systemic performance is often taken for granted.

One problem is the lack of systematic analysis of how patron-client ties operate, how they are channelled through clientelist networks and what impact they have on political institutions.

Case studies of areas in which clientelism appears systematically, such as party politics, personnel reshufflings after elections and allocations of public funding, should be explicitly directed at identifying types of clientelist practices.

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